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"...economic interests in Israel are perpetuating the occupation.  
It makes it so much harder to end." 
-Sam Bahour, a Palestinian businessman1 
 
Part I: Introduction 
The Israeli concrete market is built on shaky ground. On May 8, 2011, activists from 
Who Profits? captured a video of a cargo truck exiting the West Bank and bringing its wares into 
Israel.2 The truck easily passed through checkpoints and the West Bank border, something the 
Palestinian workers who mined its cargo were unable to do. The truck belonged to Hanson Israel, 
a building materials company. Who Profits? filmed its journey on an evidence-collecting mission 
to investigate whether the company was profiting from illegally quarried Palestinian stone. Their 
suspicions were confirmed. Although it was only a single truck, the clandestine movement of 
Palestinian natural resources into Israel was a symbol for a greater crisis of capital. Israel has 
extracted and collected massive amounts of Palestinian natural resources through partnerships 
with corporations like Heidelberg. However, organizations like Who Profits? have been 
documenting, publicizing, and fighting those partnerships. Through analyzing scenarios like 
Heidelberg's illegal trucking of Palestinian stone, it is possible to explore the relationship 
                                                           
1 Ethan Bronner, "Desert's Sand and Rocks Become Precious Resources in West Bank Dispute," 
New York Times, March 7, 2009, accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/07/world/middleeast/07westbank.html.  
2 "Hanson Quarry of HeidelbergCement in the West Bank," YouTube video, posted by "Who 
Profits?," May 8, 2011, accessed May 8, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ols86IYCuio.  
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between Israel and its building materials corporate partners in terms of the paradoxical policies 
and faulty logic that relationship is built on.  
This paper focuses on Hanson Israel, a subsidiary company of Germany-based 
HeidelbergCement, as a case study for how Israel uses legal permissions, incentives, and 
regulations for corporations to further their exploitation of Palestinian resources. This tilted legal 
system has disregarded the rights of the Palestinian workforce while constructively interfering 
with the profit incentives of Heidelberg.  Constructive interference is a phenomenon where 
powerful waves of force intersect at their strongest points, multiplying their power. For instance, 
explosives used in quarrying, or demolition, are most powerful when their blast waves intersect 
with each other. The Israeli legal system and the profit incentives of Heidelberg mutually 
reinforce each other, as if they are operating on the same wavelength. The result is a corporation 
with the legally-granted dual powers to justify the annexation of Palestinian territories and 
construct Israeli settlements in their place. However, the partnership between Israel and 
Heidelberg being laid out clearly in the form of policies, court opinions, and corporate actions 
has made it more open to critique. The medium that grants their symbiotic relationship 
legitimacy is also a vulnerability. While Israel and HeidelbergCement use the law as a 
mechanism to further a mutually beneficial settler-colonial project, these laws also provide 
ground on which the logic and legitimacy of the project can be challenged. 
Part II examines the different ways the Israeli state and Heidelberg work in tandem to 
achieve their interests as a settler-colonial state and capitalist entity respectively. There are three 
sections on land, labor, and market strength that analyze how state policies, corporate profits, and 
mutual complicity in human rights abuses provide means for both Israel and Heidelberg to 
expand their capital, including property. Part III looks at the building materials market, decisions 
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by the Israeli Supreme Court, and international law related to occupying powers, in order to 
analyze how non-profits, Palestinians, and international organizations have pushed for 
Palestinian rights using legal challenges. In this way, activists have exposed the illegitimacy of 
Israel's colonial project in cases where litigation has proved ineffective. Throughout this section 
are ways legal activism can strengthen other arms of the movement for Palestinian rights. The 
Conclusion summarizes this idea through a conceptualization of activism as a dialectic process. 
 
Part II: Colonialism and Capitalism in Concert 
Heidelberg Cement is a for-profit buildings materials corporation.3 Since 2009, they've 
shown a revenue increase of over 20% in what they call the "Africa-Mediterranean Basin," 
which includes Israel.4 The other countries in the Mediterranean that Heidelberg operates in are 
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. They also claim to be the market leader in the eight sub-
Saharan countries in Africa where they operate.5 These are countries undergoing large-scale 
infrastructure development where Heidelberg sees the potential for long-term growth.  Israel's 
need to construct new settlements, in addition to structures like the separation wall and 
transportation infrastructure, has made it a lucrative market for the building materials industry. 
However, unlike the other countries, Israel is building infrastructure on land they have no legal 
claim to. In Israel, Heidelberg participates in the cement, aggregates, concrete-asphalt, and 
                                                           
3 "HeidelbergCement," HeidelbergCement Group, accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://www.heidelbergcement.com/en/company.  
4 "Growth in Metropolitan Areas: Annual Report 2015," HeidelbergCement, March 17, 2016, 
accessed May 8, 2016, downloaded from http://www.heidelbergcement.com/en/reports-and-
presentations, 61. 
5 "Africa-Eastern Mediterranean Basin," HeidelbergCement, accessed May 8, 2016,  
http://www.heidelbergcement.com/en/africa-eastern-mediterranean-basin.  
  5 
 
   
 
service industries. Heidelberg, as a global capitalist firm, has acted on the opportunities that offer 
the most potential for profit. From the perspective of a business seeking to maximize profit, it 
makes sense that Heidelberg operates in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). 
However, acting on the incentive of profit does not make a business' operations ethically neutral, 
and not all building projects are ethically equal in their impacts. 
In order for Israel to build their settlements, they need materials like concrete. In order 
for Heidelberg to continue raising its revenue, it must continually find new construction projects 
to supply concrete for, or new land to quarry. The result is a cycle of expansion that continues to 
acquire land and labor from Palestinians. This section is intended to be a survey and analysis of 
the various ways that Heidelberg and Israel have used state policy to further each other's 
interests. 
A. Land 
The transfer of capital from Palestine to Israel is often discreet due to the potential for 
backlash against the corporations or states involved. Because of this, organizations and initiatives 
have been created to hold buyers and traders accountable to the legality and impacts of their 
supply lines. Who Profits? is a research center founded by the Coalition of Women for Peace, "a 
feminist organization against the occupation of Palestine and for a just peace."6 According to 
Who Profits?, Hanson Israel operates four projects in Israeli settlements in the West Bank7: 
Concrete plants in Modi'in Illit and Atarot, and an asphalt plant and aggregates quarry south of 
                                                           
6 "About CWP," Coalition of Women for Peace, accessed May 6, 
http://www.coalitionofwomen.org/about-1/about/?lang=en.  
7 "About Who Profits?," Who Profits?, accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://www.whoprofits.org/content/about-who-profits.  
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Elkana.8 There, they have access to the rich, non-renewable natural resource of Palestinian stone. 
Settlement quarries provide about a quarter of Israel's total quarried product needs, and 75% of 
the materials extracted from settlement quarries is exported to Israel.9,10 This would be 
impossible for Heidelberg to accomplish if they were not given access to Area C, the part of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories that Israel retains full power over law enforcement, planning, 
and infrastructure.11 The Oslo Accords also divided Palestine into Area A, Area B, and Area C, 
each with varying levels of Palestinian autonomy. Area A, which is under the control of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), takes up only 18% of the West Bank. Even these are separated by 
checkpoints and borders from areas controlled by Israel.12 Area B takes up the remainder, and is 
under Israeli control with some marginal input from the Palestinian police. Area C is the only 
contiguous area of the OPT, and makes up a majority of the OPT. 70% of Area C has been 
allocated to be controlled by the regional councils of Israeli settlements, with no Palestinian 
input. A map of the Area divisions is attached as an annex to this paper. 
Heidelberg benefits from access to Area C and its resources. It also contributes to the 
expansion of that territory. Once businesses and settlements are set up in the West Bank, a 
                                                           
8 "HeidelbergCement," Who Profits?, accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://www.whoprofits.org/company/heidelbergcement.  
9 "HCJ 2164/09 – Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights v the Commander of the IDF Forces 
in the West Bank," Yesh Din, September 3, 2009, accessed May 8, 2016, http://www.yesh-
din.org/en/petition-to-halt-all-israeli-quarry-and-mining-activities-in-the-west-bank-hcj-216409-
yesh-din-volunteers-for-human-rights-v-the-commander-of-the-idf-forces-in-the-west-bank/.  
10 Mel Frykberg, "Israel Stripping West Bank Quarries," Electronic Intifada, May 2, 2009, 
accessed May 8, 2016, https://electronicintifada.net/content/israel-stripping-west-bank-
quarries/8210.  
11 "Area C of the West Bank: Key Humanitarian Concerns," United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, occupied Palestinian Territory, January 2013, accessed 
May 8, 2016, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_area_c_factsheet_january_2013_english.pdf.  
12 Ehab Zahriyeh, "Maps: the occupation of the West Bank," Al Jazeera America, July 4, 2014, 
accessed May 8, 2016, http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/7/west-bank-security.html.  
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network of fences surrounds them. The perimeter expands as time goes on to encompass more 
and more territory.13 By creating a presence of workers and infrastructure at the periphery of 
Israel's territorial claims, Heidelberg paves the way for new territorial claims; for the justification 
of security forces and civilian settlements. Heidelberg reported in its 2015 profit report that while 
Israel's economy stagnated, they were able to maintain a steady increase in profits due to 
"numerous infrastructure projects and a slight increase in residential construction."14 Most of 
Hanson Israel's activities in the West Bank are not well-documented since the organization does 
not provide public reports on their activity in the region. However, a Hanson concrete truck has 
been documented transporting concrete to the Barkan settlement in the West Bank for 
construction. There is also the aforementioned video taken by Who Profits? of a Hanson truck 
carrying quarried material from the West Bank into Tel Aviv. The construction they are referring 
to in their profit report is, at best, an extraction of Palestinian resources to Israel, and at worst, 
the underground construction of more illegal settlements. 
Rather than neutrally allow Heidelberg to operate, Israel takes active measures to support 
their spread into the OPT. They do this despite their occupation ostensibly being a temporary 
measure while Palestinian society rebuilds. Israel signed the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement (the 
Oslo II Accord) on September 28, 1995, promising to let Palestine build up an autonomous 
government "for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the date of signing the 
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area... on May 4, 1994."15 However, the 
                                                           
13 "Occupation, Inc.: How Settlement Businesses Contribute to Israel's Violations of Human 
Rights," Human Rights Watch, January 19, 2016, accessed May 8, 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/19/occupation-inc/how-settlement-businesses-contribute-
israels-violations-palestinian, Summary. 
14 "Annual Report 2015," HeidelbergCement, 73.  
15 "1995 Oslo Interim Agreement," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 28, 1995, 
accessed May 8, 2016, 
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occupation has continued far beyond the deadline. In fact, Israel began building its separation 
wall in the West Bank in 2002.16 A similar five-year transition period was promised in the first 
Oslo Accord, signed in 1993.17 One tool the Israeli government uses to encourage business 
operations and settlements in the West Bank is the designation of "National Priority 
Areas(NPAs)."18 NPAs receive large government subsidies towards development and education, 
as well as subsidized mortgages.19 This makes it easy for burgeoning business operations to 
attract Israeli workers and quickly develop infrastructure for operation and trade. Meanwhile, 
harsh Israeli policies towards Palestinian businesses and infrastructure cause many Palestinians 
to leave Area C,20 clearing the way for Israel to acquire more territory. The difference between 
whose communities are allowed to build themselves up, and whose must be fled, is based in 
discrimination. 
                                                           
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20israeli-
palestinian%20interim%20agreement.aspx.  
16 "Israel profile - timeline," BBC News, April 19, 2016, accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29123668.  
17 "Text: 1993 Declaration of Principles," BBC News, September 1993, accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/168
2727.stm.  
18 Barak Ravid, "PM's Plan Would Put Some Settlements on Map of National Priority 
Communities," Haaretz, December 10, 2009, accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://www.haaretz.com/pm-s-plan-would-put-some-settlements-on-map-of-national-priority-
communities-1.2448.  
19 "Separate and Unequal: Israel's Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories," Human Rights Watch, December 19, 2010, accessed May 8, 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/12/19/separate-and-unequal/israels-discriminatory-treatment-
palestinians-occupied.  
20 "Israel: Court Permits Discriminatory Evictions," Human Rights Watch, May 19, 2015, 
accessed May 8, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/19/israel-court-permits-
discriminatory-evictions.  
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Acquiring territory from a legal perspective requires more than just a physical 
occupation. One way Israel makes legal claims on Palestinian land is through eminent domain.21 
Under the current laws, any land that has not been cultivated for three to ten years, depending on 
its distance from a community, becomes "state land." Any uncultivated land more than two-and-
a-half kilometers from a built-up community also becomes state land. These laws apply to the 
settlements in the West Bank as well as Israel. There is almost no land more than two-and-a-half 
kilometers from any community in the West Bank because of the incredibly crowded conditions, 
so that clause is ineffective. However, Israel used claims that Palestinian land was undeveloped 
for a number years to seize 5,114 dunams (1264 acres) of land in the West Bank from 2005 to 
2009 alone, for a total of 913,000 dunams (225,606 acres) as of April 12, 2016. This is about 
16% of the West Bank.  The construction of settlements just outside the Green Line is used as a 
tool to expand "state land." This process requires concrete and other building materials. While 
those materials are expended, the annexation process simultaneously expands the natural 
resources to which Israel has access. The process of extraction and production becomes a cycle.  
These processes occur despite the Oslo Accords stating that Israel should seek to 
transition power of the OPT back to Palestine within five years time.22  The processes of 
subsuming Palestinian communities as 'state land' and building settlements, while constantly 
expanding the borders of Israel, implies a move towards permanent settlement. Heidelberg and 
its operations in the West Bank are playing an integral part in this relentless growth, not just as 
another business stretching Israel's territory of operations out past the Green Line, but also as a 
                                                           
21 B'Tselem, "By Hook and By Crook: Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank," Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Autumn 2010), accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1525/jps.2010.xl.1.198.pdf?_=1460457644866. 
22 "1993 Declaration," BBC News. 
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source of materials with which to construct new permanent settlements in Palestinian territory.23  
Not only is the occupation planned by the Israeli government to be permanent, they are relying 
on its permanence to continue annexing territory. 
 
B. Labor 
Palestinian land-owners are denied the ability to profit off their own natural resources. 
Because of that, Palestinian manual laborers are unable to work in their fields due to a lack of 
available jobs. Then, when Israeli firms enter the area and begin profiting, the Palestinians are 
denied the rights and protections afforded to Israeli workers. They are often coerced into 
working for the firms, like Heidelberg, encroaching on their territory. These industries that 
enable the occupation that has destroyed the Palestinian economy now act on the resulting 
desperation as a business opportunity. The availability of hard labor becomes one less thing the 
state of Israel has to worry about when planning the expansion of quarrying and concrete 
businesses, and by extension, the expansion of Israel. In addition, the profit produced by 
Palestinian labor works its way almost entirely into Israeli hands. The cycle of investment into a 
violent, profitable system continues. 
Historically, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have had to rely on the labor laws of 
the Jordanian Authority to protect their rights. They had no recourse in Israeli courts against their 
employers, despite living within the Occupied Territories where Israel was imposing military 
law. Palestinian workers were being paid lower wages, and were not accessing protections like 
health insurance offered by Israeli companies. Even today, there is a struggle to make sure 
                                                           
23 "HeidelbergCement," Who Profits?. 
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Palestinian communities are educated about their new rights. One of the workers in the West 
Bank interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Ibrahim, was not aware until the interview that he 
was entitled to a minimum wage.24 
In 2007, the human rights group Ka LaOved brought a case to the Israeli Supreme Court 
arguing that Palestinians should be protected by Israeli labor laws, and that the system in place 
was discriminatory on the basis of ethnicity.25 The Court unanimously agreed. Since the 
applicable law was never specified in the business contracts used as evidence, they decided they 
should defer to whichever law had the 'strongest ties' to the contract. Since the corporations were 
based in Israel for taxes and other and legal purposes, followed Israeli laws for workers living in 
the settlements, and some of the contracts were explicitly for the Israeli government, the law 
with the closest ties was clearly Israeli. Kav LaOved reports that the case took 14 years to pass. 
This slow movement through the Court was indicative of the Israeli government's desire to keep 
labor cheap in the settlements, in order to encourage Israelis to move there.26 
Though most of Heidelberg's business records are not public, Human Rights Watch had 
an enlightening email correspondence with the director of Group Communication & Investor 
Relations for Heidelberg, Andreas Schaller. Andreas claimed that of the 36 Hanson employees 
who held citizenship with the Palestinian Authority, all were paid minimum wage and were 
given the same benefits as Israeli employees.27 This may be true. However, if it is not, it is 
                                                           
24 "Occupation, Inc.," Human Rights Watch, Section VI. 
25 "HCJ 5666/03, Kav LaOved v. National Labour Court," Versa: Opinions of the Supreme Court 
of Israel, October 10, 2007, accessed May 8, 2016, http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/kav-
laoved-v-national-labour-court.  
26 Salwa Alenat, "Palestinian Workers in the West Bank Settlements," Kav LaOved: Worker's 
Hotline, March 12, 2010, http://www.kavlaoved.org.il/en/palestinian-workers-in-the-west-bank-
settlements/.  
27 "Occupation, Inc.," Human Rights Watch, Annex VIII. 
  12 
 
   
 
unlikely to ever come to light. While the Supreme Court decided in 2007 that Palestinians 
employed by Israeli firms were protected under Israeli labor laws, this decision has yet to be 
enforced. A lack of resources, confusion over which laws to apply, and a lack of available law 
enforcement have all been cited by government agencies as reasons firms in the settlements have 
not been subject to oversight. 28 With oversight lacking, trust is left to the companies to behave 
in accordance with Israeli law. In addition, Palestinians are decentivized from filing suits against 
their employers due to backlash. The Israeli system of work permit distribution, which grants 
Palestinians the ability to enter settlements to work, includes a background check for actions 
deemed a threat to the Israeli security. There is precedent for Palestinians having work permits 
denied. This essentially cuts them off from employment prospects, due to having filed suits 
against their Israeli employers in the past. In fact, Israeli corporations have used this as a 
bargaining chip, or a threat, to prevent Palestinian employees from bringing cases against them.29 
This is the reason Ibrahim provided when asked by the interview from Human Rights Watch if 
he would seek a suit against his employer.30 Even when workers are able to overcome the lack of 
oversight, the threats, and the fear, their cases often languish in Court. Most of the lawsuits 
brought to court by Kav LaOved from 2008-2013 were still being discussed in court as of July 7, 
2013. 31 
Even in the rare situation where Palestinian workers are aware of their rights, willing to 
sue, and likely to be successful, there are ways around granting Palestinian workers Israeli labor 
protections. In addition to the 36 employed Palestinians, Schaller claimed that Hanson employed 
                                                           
28 Ibid., Section VI. 
29 Alenat, "Palestinian Workers." 
30 "Occupation, Inc.," Human Rights Watch, Section VI. 
31 Alenat, "Palestinian Workers." 
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25 more Palestinians through subcontractors.32 This is a significant 40% of their Palestinian labor 
force. Hanson is under no obligation to pay any of the employees hired through Palestinian 
subcontractors minimum wage. For the last few decades, a culture has been created in the West 
Bank specifically of Israeli firms hiring contractors who then theoretically distribute the money 
they make from providing labor to the contracted employees.33 However, these employers help 
the firms skirt accountability. Some ways they do this are by only providing their own names on 
employee forms, skimming part of the wages provided for themselves, or holding a high social 
status that prevents them from being targeted by lower-waged workers within their communities. 
Heidelberg is complicit in this middle-man system. As a result, they are denying fair wages and 
benefits to nearly half of their employed Palestinian workforce. By not addressing these 
loopholes, the Israeli legal system is passively responsible for allowing them to occur.  
As a concrete and quarrying company, Heidelberg employs Palestinian labor in an even 
more malicious way than solely attracting settler investment and saving money on labor. They 
actually employ people to create the literal building blocks of the structures used to subsume 
their land. Palestinians are not just denied Israeli permits to quarry. Almost all permits to build, 
develop, or extract resources from land are also denied.34 These prohibitions create a scenario 
where Palestinian workers are desperate for jobs in order to survive, and willing to work for a 
company profiting from the natural resources they had previously owned. The result is a self-
perpetuating machine of territorial spread and economic dependence, with Palestinians forced to 
put in the labor necessary for it to function.  
                                                           
32 "Occupation, Inc.," Human Rights Watch, Annex VIII. 
33 Alenat, "Palestinian Workers." 
34 "West Bank and Gaza - Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy (English)," the World 
Bank, October 2, 2013, accessed May 8, 2016,  
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The Israeli economy, the economy of settlements specifically, is premised on a strong 
construction industry that allows that the state to continue expanding. It is beneficial to both the 
state and building materials corporations, including Heidelberg, to make sure that Israeli firms 
are accessing as many of the resources within the Occupied Territories as possible. They avoid 
the alternative of letting Palestinians control their own supply lines. This allows the firms to 
produce goods cheaply and have a consistent market while avoiding competition, while Israel 
receives a larger portion of the profit produced through taxes. However, this oligopoly, or 
monopoly-by-state, can only be achieved through the suppression of a 'free market' that would 
allow Palestinian businesses to compete on equal grounds with Israeli businesses. To that end, 
Israel and Heidelberg have historically worked with each other in order to secure Heidelberg and 
similar companies access to Palestinian resources, while cutting Palestinians out of the market.  
Israel is extremely selective when they grant licenses to Palestinian businesses, if they 
ever grant those licenses. The Palestinian Union of Stone and Marble, representing over 500 
Palestinian businesses, has reported that no licenses have been issued to Palestinian quarry 
businesses.35 Palestinian quarries that choose to operate without a license face threats of 
equipment confiscation, decimating the livelihood of the workers.36 Often, Israel's Civil 
Administration holds onto a permit application indefinitely instead of outright rejecting it.37  
                                                           
35 "Israel: Businesses Should End Settlement Activity," Human Rights Watch, January 19, 2016, 
accessed May 8, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/19/israel-businesses-should-end-
settlement-activity.  
36 "Occupation, Inc.," Human Rights Watch, Section III. 
37 Ibid. 
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The designation of National Priority Areas provides tax breaks and subsidies both to 
Israeli businesses operating in the settlements, and to settlers that take advantage of the 
employment opportunities these businesses offer. The settlements that Heidelberg operates in; 
Modi'in Illit, Atarot, and Elkana; are all in the Jordan Valley, and were included in the new map 
of National Priority Areas released in 2009.38 While the Jordan Valley settlements also include 
some Arab towns and villages, individual ministers of Israel have the exclusive right to assign 
funds to whichever regions or causes in their jurisdiction that they see fit.39 This funding is then 
not reported in a centralized or publicly available location, which means I was unable to find out 
for certain if Heidelberg's operations had received subsidies. However, Adalah, a legal center for 
Arab and minority rights in Israel, believes the new system is "liable to increase inequality 
between Jewish and Arab towns within NPAs."40  It is highly likely that funds are being 
concentrated in Jewish Israeli settlements while Arab and Palestinian communities are left to 
catch up on their own. If this is not the case, there would have been no need to create such an 
opaque, inauditable system. 
The location of settlements, and by extension PRAs and settlement businesses, is 
intimately tied to the health and size of the Israeli market. At a Trade Office meeting in 1982, 
one Israeli minister explained that the location of settlements was largely based on the potential 
for growth and sustainability; choosing locations that could attract as many settler-workers as 
possible and keeping them there with bustling industry.41 Israel's Interior Ministry made similar 
                                                           
38 Ravid, "PM's Plan." 
39 "Adalah Position Paper: On the Israeli Government’s New Decision Classifying Communities 
as National Priority Areas," Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab and Minority Rights in Israel, 
February 2010, accessed May 8, 2016, 
http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/newsletter/eng/feb10/docs/english%20layout.pdf.  
40 Ibid. 
41 “Occupation, Inc.," human Rights Watch, Section III. 
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arguments and assumptions in March of 2008 about quarried materials specifically. He said that 
at the current rates of extraction and construction, quarries within Area C will be depleted in 38 
years, transformed into concrete settlements and Israeli infrastructure.42 Recall that the 
settlements were declared by the Israeli government to last for five years in a signed document of 
international law. 
One time Heidelberg was somewhat hampered by the state is during its attempted sale of 
Hanson Israel. They intended to sell Hanson to Mashab, a company of the Israeli-owned IDB 
Group. No reason was specifically provided by Heidelberg for the sale of a consistently 
profitable arm of their company. However, the sale was initiated in October 2009,43 just months 
after a petition that March to the Israeli Supreme Court aimed at stopping the illegal quarrying of 
Palestinian land caused the government to freeze the construction of any new quarries until the 
case was settled.44 The petition was filed by Yesh Din, an Israel-based organization that 
advocates for the rights of Palestinians. It makes sense that this mounting pressure would have 
caused Heidelberg to attempt a sale, fearing divestment or future legal restrictions. Israel's 
Antitrust Authority blocked the sale to Mashab on the grounds that the IDB Group already held a 
monopoly on cement production in Israel and controlled a significant amount of the 
                                                           
42 "High Court sanctions looting: Israeli quarries in the West Bank," B'Tselem - The Israeli 
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, January 12, 2016, accessed 
May 8, 2016, http://www.btselem.org/settlements/20120116_hcj_ruling_on_quarries_in_wb.  
43 Guy Liberman, "Livnats, Dankner Want to Cement Business," Haaretz, October 20, 2009, 
accessed May 8, 2016, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/livnats-dankner-want-to-
cement-business-1.5799.  
44 Yaakov Lappin, "Israel freezes expansion of West Bank quarries following High Court 
petition," The Jerusalem Post, May 21, 2009, accessed May 9, 2016, 
http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Israel-freezes-expansion-of-West-Bank-quarries-following-High-
Court-petition.  
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transportation infrastructure needed to trade quarried materials.45 They attempted to sell Hanson 
again in March 2011 to a company called Electra.46 A monopoly would have raised the price of 
building materials for the state of Israel, so there was a vested interest in maintaining competition 
and not allowing Heidelberg to end their operations in Israel. On the other hand, Heidelberg has 
continues to profit and contribute to the construction of Israeli settlements beyond the Green 
Line in more ways than one. They haven't faced material harms and continue to be complicit.  
In their email exchange, Human Rights Watch reveals that Heidelberg has contributed 
3,250,000€ (about $3,660,000 as of April 11, 2016) to the Civil Administration of Judea and 
Samaria. The Judea and Samaria Area is the Israeli government's official term for the West 
Bank. They paid another 430,000€ (about $484,000) in taxes to the local municipal government 
of Elkana, the Shomron Regional Council. Those taxes came from their Nahal Raba quarry 
alone, located near Elkana.47 This money is then used by the state to build infrastructure, houses 
and roads as well as fences, in order to reify their claim over what has previously been un- or 
under-developed territory. Even the money that is taken away from Heidelberg goes back into a 
system that legitimizes their business operations and allows them to exploit the resources of a 
colonized territory.  
It is clear that Israel's strategy is to design the concrete market so that the eventual profits 
resulting from natural resource extraction flow to the Israeli state. Their restriction of the 
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Palestinian economy creates the conditions for territorial expansion outwards through the land on 
which they previously made development illegal. This process creates a path for Israeli 
expansion that makes it for impossible for Palestinians to benefit from their own quarried 
materials. The end result is a waiting game where Israel only has to prevent Palestinians from 
quarrying their own land for as long as it takes for Israel to make a legal claim to subsume that 
land. The Israeli waiting game has thus far been effective in maintaining the path towards their 
own sustainable development outlined by the Trade Office in 1984, and the Interior Ministry in 
2009. 
 
Part III: Cracks and Contradictions 
Despite the efficiency with which Heidelberg and Israel work towards gaining new 
economic or literal ground for each other, the system is not perfect. The legal contortions 
necessary for their deeply inequitable partnership have left the two uncomposed, and vulnerable 
to disruption. Various non-profits, Israeli state entities, and individuals have used statements, 
Court decisions, and economic actions to point out the cracks in the legal infrastructure 
supporting Heidelberg and Israel's collaborations. Attempts to patch these cracks have only led 
to an inconsistent structure that often contradicts itself. This section shows how the logic and 
legitimacy of the partnership between a settler-colonial state and a global capitalist corporation 
has been challenged from within and without the state through examinations of the laws meant to 
govern their actions. 
A. Market regulations 
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Israel has the ability to control the imports and exports of the West Bank, issue business 
licenses to Palestinians, and annex economically valuable territory. This means they have a 
unique ability to control the Palestinian market, in this case for concrete, in a way that benefits 
Israeli corporations like Hanson Israel. Despite this, Palestinians, international organizations, and 
non-profits have used these actions to critique the legitimacy of Israel's expansion and draw 
attention to the criminality of Israel's continued economic exploitation of the West Bank. 
Meanwhile, Israel's Antitrust Authority has exposed the flawed logic of claims by Israel and the 
United States that Israel operates a free market economy.48,49 
i. Illegal quarry operations 
Despite the lack of licenses being issued to Palestinian quarries, many continue to operate 
illegally. Human Rights Watch conducted a series of interviews with Palestinian quarry owners 
in Beit Fajar, a town about 20 kilometers south of Bethlehem. Four of the quarry owners they 
interviewed were operating illegally in the Area C section of Beit Fajar.50 One of the owner's 
sons, given the pseudonym Jamal, reported that they had been resubmitting permit applications 
monthly for years, all the while continuing to operate their quarry illegally. Another quarry 
owner has had his permit applications consistently denied with no explanation, despite offering 
to build a fence around his quarry so that it would be clear the quarry does not infringe on the 
territory of the nearby settlement. The refusal to provide a reason for permit denial is common 
practice by the Israeli government. So is the practice of holding a permit application indefinitely 
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instead of explicitly approving or denying it. Palestinians who are found to be extracting 
resources from quarries have their equipment confiscated. The equipment costs large amounts of 
money to retrieve, and those costs can spell death for a burgeoning business.  
The continued quarrying of Palestinian land in Area C by Palestinian businesses is an act 
of resistance to Israel's colonial project. It shows a clear lack of respect for the legitimacy and 
discretion of the Israeli Civil Administration, which issues quarrying permits. This sends a 
message to the international community that average Palestinian workers and business owners 
are refusing to accept the occupation as legitimate, and are operating under their own 
conceptions of which business operations are permissible. For example, Jamal continues to 
attend trade shows abroad, though he cannot produce enough stone to meet foreign demand due 
to the restricted schedule he works under in order to hide his operations from Israeli authorities.51 
The Palestinian quarry-owners and workers are also actively engaged in the process of creating a 
Palestinian economy that does not rely on employment by Israeli firms. The economy based on 
reliance displaces Palestinians from their homes in order to find work. It contributes to the 
widespread poverty in the West Bank by providing Palestinians with only a small fraction of the 
wealth created through substandard wage laws. Samer, the pseudonym given to one of the quarry 
owners, said that he employed five to six Palestinians at any given time before having his 
equipment confiscated. Not only that, he claimed he would be able to hire at least thirty to forty 
more people had he not been forced to operate in secret.52 Creating employee networks, training 
skilled laborers, and investing in future infrastructure like quarrying equipment are critical steps 
towards creating an autonomous Palestinian economy in the future to counter the harms of the 
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occupation's restrictive market. The Palestinian shadow market for building materials is denying 
Israel future profits from the non-renewable resources extracted from quarries. The unethical and 
illegal system of denying the ability for land to be developed until it has been enveloped by 
settlements cannot succeed, or at least is hampered, if the resources have already been withdrawn 
from the land. This is doubly beneficial to the Palestinians, since the concrete and profit created 
from quarried stone go towards building and funding new Israeli settlements when controlled by 
the state of Israel. 
 
ii. Hypocrisy of the Antitrust Authority 
The Israeli Antitrust Authority blocked the sale of Hanson Concrete from 
HeidelbergCement to IDB Group because IDB Group already had a monopoly on cement 
production and transportation within Israel. Due to a growing market for concrete needed to 
build Israeli settlements, the deal would have handed IDB Group a captive market. The specific 
antitrust laws cited in the decision are not available publicly. This is because the Israeli Antitrust 
Authority's website only provides records of cases going back to 2011,53 and the sale was 
blocked in 2009.54 However, the Antitrust Authority provides the following passage to explain 
their Mission:55 
The Antitrust Authority and its leadership are responsible for maintaining and promoting 
competition in the Israeli economy. The Antitrust Authority was established in 1994 with 
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the passage of the Antitrust Law Amendment and the addition of Article 41 to the law. The 
Antitrust Law provides the Director-General with various powers that make it possible to 
address anti-competitive behavior in all its forms. With these powers the authority makes 
efforts to increase and encourage competition where it exists, to create conditions for 
increased competition where it does not exist, to enforce the provisions of the law when 
they are violated, and to increase awareness of competition law. 
If the Antitrust Authority's job is to maintain, promote, and encourage competition, 
specifically in sectors where competition does not exist, they are failing within the concrete 
industry. By not addressing Israel's discriminatory, ethnicity-based license distribution system, 
the Antitrust Authority is complicit in the monopoly of the IDB Group in the concrete production 
and transportation sectors, and the oligopoly of IDB Group and Heidelberg in the quarrying 
industry. There are many capable Palestinian business-owners who have the infrastructure, or 
could invest in the infrastructure if given the same NPA benefits as Israeli settlements within 
Area C, who are denied the ability to participate in the 'free market.' This hypocrisy exposes the 
false claims by Israel and the United States that Israel operates a free market, or anything 
resembling a meritocracy. This revelation is potentially useful for business-owners, non-profits, 
and international organizations who are investigating and dismantling the systems of power and 
oppressive policies that Israel uses to deny Palestinians access to their own natural resources, and 
by extension the profit and market they need to achieve autonomy in the future.  
Another failure of the Antitrust Authority that provides ammunition to those arguing 
against the legitimacy of the occupation is the existence of IDB Group's monopoly on transport 
in the concrete industry. Specifically, one of IDB Group's partners, the Livnat family, "controls 
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interests in related industries including cargo handling for infrastructure companies."56 Given 
that they have a monopoly on the transportation infrastructure needed to move quarried materials 
and concrete, it is difficult or impossible for new businesses to enter the market without the 
complicity of IDB Group. Transportation infrastructure and vehicles are needed both to sell 
concrete and quarried materials, and to transfer them to the location where they will be used.  
Nesher is the company that currently holds a monopoly on concrete production in Israel. 
It is a subsidiary of CLAL Industries, which is a subsidiary of IDB Group.57 In 2014, the 
Antitrust Authority ordered Nesher to break up by forcing them to sell a factory in Har Tuv that 
produces one-million tons of concrete a year.58 Though this sale hasn't happened yet, it does set 
the precedent that the Antitrust Authority has the ability to break up monopolies in the concrete 
industry. Nesher was forced, at least, to lower their prices by 2%.59 It is indicative of a tacit 
support for IDB Group's continued monopoly in the concrete industry that the Antitrust 
Authority has not attempted to break up the Livnat family's transportation monopoly, since 
transportation is a prerequisite to market access. The Israeli-centric positions of the Antitrust 
Authority on what constitutes a 'free market' expose the paradoxical policy suggestions necessary 
to maintain an expanding colonial occupation, while denying the ability of those slowly being 
annexed to sustain themselves on the resources they have access to. However, the Antitrust 
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Authority is not the sole Israeli governmental institution struggling with these inconsistencies in 
their purported mission and their material actions. 
B. The Israeli Supreme Court 
Israel's Supreme Court(the Court) has made decisions in the past that have impeded the 
colonial project. Such is to be expected from a court that takes into account international laws 
related to occupying states, and not just domestic laws.60 The inability of these decisions to 
prevent the continued illegal occupation has highlighted the disconnect between the power of 
jurisprudence and the actions the state is willing to take. This section explores a few specific 
instances related to the concrete and quarrying industries. In addition, when the Court has been 
complicit in the efforts of Heidelberg and other companies in tandem with the state of Israel to 
annex and profit from Palestinian land, their justifications have been built on faulty logic. 
Ultimately, the Court's disjointed relationship with the settler-colonial project, and the litigation 
process itself, have provided new avenues to organizers for Palestinian rights and international 
organizations to challenge the legitimacy of the occupation and document the criminal offenses 
of the state of Israel. 
i. The Illegal Priority Areas System 
The National Priority Area system used to exist in a different form. Until 2006, there was 
a centralized list of which neighborhoods were considered NPAs, instead of leaving it to 
individual ministers to allocate money within their regions to different sectors at their discretion. 
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That list contained about five-hundred Jewish communities, and four Palestinian communities.61 
In a landmark Court decision that took eight years to deliberate, the Court ruled unanimously in 
2006 that the NPA system was discriminatory, specifically by race and nationality. This is 
referred to as the High Follow-Up Committee Case. Justice Rivlin, a Justice on the Court at the 
time, said the system of selecting National Priority Areas was "tainted by prohibited 
discrimination and unlawfully violates the right to equality, a basic right that is enshrined in our 
constitutional law."62 
The legal challenge to the NPA system came from Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab and 
Minority Rights in Israel; the Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel; and the 
Supreme Monitoring Committee for Education Affairs in Israel.63 In creating their petition to the 
Court, the organizations researched the socioeconomic conditions of the communities that were 
added to or removed from the National Priority Area list and used the discretion between 
wealthy Jewish communities that were included in the NPA list, and poor Arab communities that 
were left out, to make their case. This has provided valuable information for other organizations, 
domestic and international, to not only contest the validity of Israel's discriminatory development 
policies, but also to identify Arab communities that are being underserved and require resources 
beyond what the state is willing to provide in order to thrive. 
After the 2006 decision by the Court, NPAs were temporarily abolished. However, on 
December 13, 2009, the Israeli government passed a new law titled “Defining Towns and Areas 
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with National Priority," reviving the NPA system in its new form.64 Adalah has pointed out that 
this directly contradicts the ruling from the High Follow-Up Committee Case, in addition to 
granting an additional layer of opacity since individual ministers will be allocating funds at their 
discretion with no required audit. The process for selecting NPAs is also highly subjective. It is 
based on a combination of distance from Tel Aviv, potential for economic development, and 
security concerns, vaguely defined. The 'security concerns' condition makes it easy for Israel to 
designate any settlement beyond the Green Line, or at the outer edge of Israel, as an NPA. The 
condition of being distant from Tel Aviv provides the state with an excuse not to designate any 
of the poor Palestinian communities within Israel as NPAs, despite them meeting the second 
condition of being economically underdeveloped.  
The security concerns condition allowed every Jewish settlement in the West Bank to be 
considered a National Priority Area. This includes Modi'in Illit, Atarot, and Elkana, where 
Heidelberg operates through Hanson Israel. In this way, Heidelberg was able to benefit through 
the increase in workers and stipends provided by the NPA program because of the establishment 
of settlements it helped to legitimize through its presence.  
While the actual list of NPAs is no longer explicit, the process of selecting them has 
become explicit. In addition, it has become apparent that the Court has little power to enforce its 
decisions when the Knesset decides to disregard them. This means that non-profits and 
individuals considering litigation to advance the rights of marginalized groups like Palestinians 
can choose alternate tactics, or can use litigation towards other ends like documentation and 
education, as Adalah did in the High Follow-Up Committee Case. 
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ii. Faulty Jurisprudence 
In 2012, Yesh Din submitted a petition to the Court requesting that it halt all quarrying 
activity by Israeli companies in the West Bank be halted, and stop the process of designating 
land for new quarries.65 In Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights, et. al. v. Commander of the 
IDF Forces in the West Bank, et. al., abbreviated here as Yesh Din c. Commander, they cited 
Article 43 of the Hague Conventions, which requires that military commanders in occupied 
territories act exclusively for the benefit of the occupied population, and Article 55, which says 
an occupying power should be regarded as the "usufructuary of public goods," meaning the 
occupying power can only benefit from the natural resources of its occupied territories if they do 
not damage those resources. In other words, only renewable resources can be legitimately 
extracted from an occupied territory due to Article 55, and the profits from those resources can 
only be spent on things that benefit the occupied people, according to Article 43. Yesh Din made 
the case that because quarried materials are non-renewable resources, and the materials and 
money were flowing into Israel instead of back into Palestinian communities, that quarrying 
operations like Heidelberg's in the West Bank were illegal on both grounds under international 
law. 
Yesh Din did mention under their claim that Israel was violating Article 55 of the Hague 
Regulations that there was an exception to the rule that the Court called the "principle of 
continuity." This meant if an occupied territory had its non-renewable resources exploited before 
the occupation, by a multinational corporation for example, then exploitation during the 
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occupation could legally continue as long as it matched pre-occupation rates. However, while the 
court acknowledged this standard, they decided to create their own standard instead, which had 
no legal precedent. Instead, it was lifted from a book by Ruby Seibel, the former legal advisor to 
the Israeli Foreign Ministry.66 They called this the 'principle of reasonableness,' and claimed it 
was acceptable for an occupying power to use the resources of its occupied territories "to an 
extent that does not lead to over-exploitation." No explicit definition of '"over-exploitation" is 
given. The blanket ban against non-renewable resources makes easy to tell when it has been 
violated. The continuity principle does not set up a clear line between legal and illegal, but at 
least provides some quantitative basis for how much resource extraction is acceptable. The 
principle of continuity is completely subjective. Indeed, the Court argued that mining in 
occupied territories was acceptable as long as it was "implemented in a negligent manner such 
that they could lead to the impairment of natural resources or the exhaustion thereof."  
The argumentation of the Court is marred by logical flaws. A warrant is never given for 
why the principle of reasonableness was preferred over the principle of continuity. The decision 
simply reads, "The state...presented a different interpretation," followed by a quote from Ruby 
Seibel's book, as well as references to the Military Manuals from the US, Britain, and Canada. 
The Court chose Ruby Seibel as a source for jurisprudential knowledge. There is a clear conflict 
of interest. The Israeli Supreme Court citing a book by a former Israeli state official, specifically 
citing a principle that had never been put into place as legal precedent, was a case of judicial 
activism where the Court intentionally created a new definition for a legally relevant term, 
usufructuary, in order to serve a third-party interest, the state. They chose to cite military 
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manuals from other nations as secondary supports to their new interpretation of usufructuary 
besides the Seibel quote. The Court made the assumption that just because other nations had 
done it that it was legal, without warranting why that would be true in light of their new 
definition's paradoxical nature. They claimed that it was acceptable to extract non-renewable 
natural resources from occupied territories like Atarot and Modi'in Illit as long as the process did 
not impair or exhaust those natural resources. They did this without addressing Yesh Din's 
arguments that extracting non-renewable resources is a process that inherently impairs and 
exhausts the resource supply; in this case, quarries. These egregious flaws combined paint a 
picture of a Court that at the time chose judicial activism and the protection of illegal activity in 
the West Bank over sound jurisprudence and deference to the international law.  
The Court also disagreed with Yesh Din's Article 43 claim that the profit from quarrying 
operations were not being used for the benefit of the people in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. They claimed the employment that quarrying companies like Heidelberg were 
providing in the West Bank was a benefit to the populations in the OPT.67 In addition, the Court 
claimed that the royalties paid by quarrying companies to the Civil Administrations in the OPT, 
which are spent on military administration, which "promotes various kinds of projects aimed to 
benefit the interests of the area." In other words, Israeli settlement communities were counted by 
the Court as communities in the occupied territories. That meant the Court only had to prove the 
collection of royalties from quarrying companies in the West Bank was benefiting Israeli 
settlements, which was true given that the money was flowing back into government programs 
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like the NPA system and infrastructure projects like fences that allowed the settlements to 
stabilize and expand. 
The Court had no valid reason to dismiss Yesh Din's Article 43 claim, but many to accept 
it. The employment of Palestinians is not unique to multinational corporations. If the Court 
stopped the illegal discrimination in license granting that prevented Palestinians from being able 
to operate their own quarries, the land would still be used to its capacity, barring externality 
concerns from the Palestinians. Even if the Court didn't take action on this issue, the incentive 
would exist for Israel to grant more licenses to Palestinians to maintain the size of the market for 
quarried materials if Israeli quarries could no longer operate in the West Bank. This means 
employment would have stayed constant in either world, or possibly increased in a world where 
more Palestinians are granted licenses, since they have access to quarries beyond the outermost 
Israeli settlements. Even if employment was reduced, providing employment alone does not 
mean companies like Heidelberg benefit the local populations in Area C in the West Bank. The 
harm of long-term profit loss due to resource extraction could outweigh the short-term 
employment benefits, especially given the poor labor conditions for Palestinians discussed 
earlier. In addition, there are large environmental externalities associated with quarries that were 
not accounted for in the decision. In 2009, The New York Times interviewed Itamar Ben David, 
chief environmental planner for the Society for the Conservation of Nature in Israel.68 He said, 
"planning regulations and environmental assessment are less strong in the West Bank than in 
Israel. In Israel, nobody wants a quarry near his residential property.” Israel's own State 
Comptroller confirmed in 2013 "that the Civil Administration’s failure to properly regulate 
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abandoned quarries in Area C has led to “serious ecological and environmental harm.”"69 Third, 
the Court's claim that Israeli settlements count as 'local populations,' communities that are part of 
the occupied territories, directly contradicts the state's decision in 2009 to designate those 
communities as National Priority Areas, Israeli communities that need to be strengthened due to 
economic and security concerns. These communities currently operate on an uncertainty 
principle where they can act either as temporary settlements in Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
or as permanent parts of Israel, depending on the interests of the arm of the Israeli state 
identifying them. 
Yesh Din's petition was ultimately unsuccessful in using Articles 55 and 43 of the Hague 
Conventions to stop Israeli quarry activity in the West Bank by companies such as Heidelberg. 
However, it revealed further layers of the paradoxical logic required to maintain the exploitative 
collaboration between the state and multinational corporations. This is useful information for 
social movements looking to target Israel or quarrying companies like Heidelberg with boycotts, 
divestment, or sanctions in order to pressure them into stopping their illegal activities. It is also 
useful for other organizations looking into using international law as a tool to regulate Israel's 
behavior through the Court, which could now be aware of the politically slanted definitions used 
by the Court for terms like 'usufrucutary' or 'local population,' and the selectively cited sources 
the Court was willing to use in order to maintain the colonial project. Ultimately, the impacts of 
the Yesh Din's case against quarrying companies like Heidelberg have stretched beyond the 
Court. As mentioned earlier, Heidelberg attempted to sell Hanson Israel after the freeze on new 
quarries was implemented during this case's discussion in Court. Though they were unsuccessful, 
the attempt was indicative of the pressure Heidelberg had begun to feel from human rights 
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advocates. This is especially impressive given that this was a single case, filed from within the 
Israeli state, whereas challenges to their legality have also emerged from abroad. 
C. International Law  
As shown in the Yesh Din v. Commander case, Israel included binding international 
treaties in its domestic jurisprudence. However, the operations of the state often contradict the 
treaties they claim to support. Israel's policies juxtaposed with the international laws they have 
agreed to follow demonstrate the contradictions inherent in a modern-day settler-colonial project, 
and show the precise ways in which the Israeli state is failing to operate within its legal limits as 
an occupying power. 
i. Obligations to the Rights of Palestinians 
On October 3, 1991 Israel ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (the Covenant).70 The Covenant is a treaty designed to recognize "the inherent dignity 
and... the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family."71 Included in the 
treaty are the rights to freedom of movement, self-determination, and an adequate standard of 
living. In the ninety-ninth session of the United Nations Human Rights Committee(UNHRC),72 
which met July 12-30, 2010, the UNHRC claimed Israel had been denying those rights to 
Palestinian by virtue of the separation wall they'd been building in the OPT. The UNHRC made 
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it clear to Israel that the Covenant was to be applied in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as 
well as Israel proper, "contrary to the State party's position." In 2004, Israel made the claim to 
the United Nations International Court of Justice (the ICJ) that human rights treaties were only to 
be applied during peacetime, to citizens of the Israeli government, and that humanitarian law was 
meant for wartime.73 The difference between human rights and humanitarian treaties is that 
human rights treaties are designed to protect people's rights normatively, while humanitarian 
treaties are meant to protect people's rights in conflict situations specifically.74 
The ICJ disagreed with Israel's interpretation. They cited an ICJ report from 1996 that 
made it clear that human rights obligations, those of the Covenant specifically, do not cease 
during conflict. Although some human rights treaties contain clauses that say they can be 
suspended during wartime, the Covenant is not one of those.75 Israel only claimed they need to 
protect human rights in parts of OPT over which they did not claim permanent sovereignty. It is 
unclear what claim they had to disregarding the Covenant in the OPT where they had constructed 
settlements, or within which they were allowing businesses like Heidelberg to operate. The same 
claims of rights abuses brought up by the ICJ; restriction of movement, denial of self-
determination, property requisition, etc.; were still applicable to Palestinians that Israel 
considered legally within their territory. A sovereignty claim comes with responsibilities, and 
Israel's attempts to distance itself from that responsibility in the ICJ came up short. Instead, they 
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exposed themselves as a colonial project that believes they have no humanitarian obligations 
towards their colonized territories. 
ii. Permanence of the Occupation 
 Israel is having an additional identity crisis on the issue of the permanence of their 
occupation of Palestine. Yesh Din's examination of the quarry industry helps explain the 
discrepancy between the temporary occupation Israel promised in the Oslo Accords and the 
permanent, growing project it has built.76 In their petition, they cited Israel's National Outline 
Plan for Mining and Quarrying for the Construction and Paving Industry, which made estimates 
on the amount of quarried materials Israel would need for the following thirty years from the 
OPT in order to maintain their current levels of construction. This expected Israeli development 
timeline stretching decades into the future is at clear odds with the purported impermanence of 
the occupation. In addition, the same state report said that quarries within Area C alone provide 
for about a quarter of the quarried material consumed by Israel. Even beyond five or thirty years, 
Israel's ongoing construction of settlements and NPA system are creating permanent extensions 
of the Israeli state. The short and medium term plans for resource extraction work in tandem with 
the development of a permanent occupation since these settlements, and the wall being built to 
encompass them, are constructed by concrete made from stone quarried from Palestinian 
territory. 
An understanding of the disparity between the occupation timeline Israel defends in 
treaties and the one it plans for in reality is necessary in the movement for Palestinian self-
determination. Israel is not going to dissolve the occupation due to a deadline given its 
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competing interest in territory acquisition and economic opportunity. In fact, the occupation fuels 
itself by accessing the very resources it needs to construct new settlements through the expansion 
of the state and the permissions granted to building materials companies to operate beyond 
Israel's legal borders. This means businesses must be targeted in addition to the state of Israel if 
the partnership between settler-colonialism and capitalism is to be disrupted. 
iii. Legitimacy of Businesses in the West Bank 
Multinational corporations, specifically Heidelberg and other building materials 
companies, act as tools of colonial expansion by legitimizing the presence of Israeli 
infrastructure and settlers in the West Bank, among other methods. However, the legitimacy of 
the corporations themselves is a prerequisite to their ability to act as legal agents of state 
expansion. The state requires these businesses operate legally, otherwise Israel would not be able 
to provide them with stipends, security, housing for workers funded by the NPA program, etc. 
They would also not be able to collect taxes. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human Rights (The Guiding Principles) is 
a guide produced by the United Nations designed to ensure businesses within UN member states, 
including Israel, are respecting human rights. These businesses are also asked to actively audit 
their supply lines to ensure they are not violating rights either. In its complicity with the illegal 
occupation, and its substandard treatment of Palestinian laborers, HeidelbergCement is acting 
against these Guiding Principles. This means Israel is granting stipends, land, and labor to a 
business that is actively violating UN principles, while at the same time claiming that its 
settlements in areas like Atarot are legitimate due to the presence of said company, and others 
like it. This is a circular argument by the Israeli state that reveals how it is necessary to assume 
the legitimacy and legality of either the occupation or the corporations first, then using them to 
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derive the legality of the other. Without the initial assumption, the logic of the colonial project 
fails. 
Although these international treaties have little ability to be enforced directly, 
international norms like the Guiding Principles have provided a platform for social movements 
to oppose multinational corporations' complicity in the expansion. One such movement is the 
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. The BDS movement is "a campaign of 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel until it complies with international law 
and Palestinian rights," and was started in 2005, a year after the ICJ issued its decision declaring 
Israel's separation barrier in the West Bank illegal.77 One recent example is the decision by large 
Norwegian firm KLP to divest from HeidelbergCement and Cemex "on the grounds of their 
exploitation of natural resources in occupied territory on the West Bank."78 International pressure 
has continued to build against the occupation. Even the United States' representative, Samantha 
Powers, expressed concern in 2014 over a planned housing expansion in Elkana, where 
Heidelberg operates an asphalt plant and a quarry. These coordinated movements are improved 
by the existence of international norms and laws that provide a means to audit the actions of the 
state of Israel, as well as the revealing contradictions raised when organizations like Yesh Din 
collect evidence and challenge the state directly. 
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
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Though the forces of capitalist corporations and settler-colonial states can seem too 
powerful to overcome when working in unison, the weak logic that makes up their base leaves 
them vulnerable to a clean demolition. Human Rights Watch argues that businesses are 
functionally 'settlers' themselves, "drawn to settlements in part by low rents, favorable tax rates, 
government subsidies, and access to cheap Palestinian labor."79 In this paper, I have elucidated 
some of the aspects that make building materials businesses specifically unique, and possibly 
more dangerous. They have access to large-scale infrastructure that allows them to permanently 
devastate land. They have legal protections that allow them to recruit Palestinian laborers, 
coerced by economic desperation, to an industry that enables the expansion of the Israeli state. 
They are able to construct entire Israeli villages where there were once only Palestinians. These 
are but a few examples. 
I think further research should be done in how businesses can be held accountable that 
participate in rights abuses. KLP's divestment from Heidelberg and Cemex is certainly a positive 
example. However, in Occupation, Inc., a Human Rights Watch Report on "how settlement 
businesses contribute to Israel’s violations of Palestinian rights," Human Rights Watch says that 
they are not calling for a boycott movement. Rather, they would prefer corporations hold 
themselves accountable. A dreaded third alternative has seen itself play out in Modi'in Illit and 
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Atarot, cities where Heidelberg operates, where Palestinians have recently violently attacked 
Israeli settlers, in 200880 and 200281 respectively. 
Critical legal scholarship has been used as a chisel to widen cracks in the armor Israel's 
partnership with Heidelberg, and to chip away at its facades. When barriers to change are 
identified, strategies change to become more effective. For example, once Palestinians employed 
by Israeli companies won the right to the Israeli minimum wage, further organizing could be 
done around the issue of subcontractors, which until then had laid under the radar. If it were not 
for organizations like Yesh Din who expose the corruption and illogic of Israel's Supreme Court, 
activists might continue trying to create change through impact legislation as opposed to a 
multilateral approach with a greater chance of success. Activism is a dialectic process. Legal 
challenges to Israel's partnerships with multinational corporations like Heidelberg have 
consistently opened new ground on which to organize for Palestinian rights. It is becoming 
evident that a project built on paradoxes has the potential to be unraveled. 
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